Futures
exchanges and stock exchanges were created to justify separate economic
needs yet both have been called into question as to whether a genuine
service was being provided, or if the exchanges and traders were just
redistributing the wealth for the benefit of themselves. Commodity
futures exchanges were intended to be a venue for price discovery, risk
transference, and price speculation, while stock exchanges were
developed as a source for raising capital for extant companies and a
co-location for investors who wished to share in the profits of these
companies. In both marketplaces, customer orders flowed into the
exchanges, where liquidity was provided by market-makers, fair value
was determined, and price
information flowed back to the customers almost simultaneously. Competition
among the MMs resulted in narrow spreads and deep markets, which
resulted in efficient price discovery.
Decimalization
eliminated the majority of market makers willing to provide liquidity
in the equity arena, while the end of open-outcry and the migration to
electronic trading, eliminated futures market makers. The majority of
liquidity is now being supplied by unregulated high-frequency traders,
who according to the TABB Group, are responsible for 56 percent of the
NYSE’s volume (includes proprietary trading shops, market makers, and
HFT hedge funds), while institutional traders comprise 17 percent
(mutual funds, pensions, asset managers), hedge funds-15%, and
retail-11%. In an Orwellian twist of fate, the business model of the
stock exchanges may have been permanently altered as a result of the exchanges going public. Now
driven by their own
shareholders’ need for returns, capital formation appears to taken a back
seat, as the exchanges roll out new technology to attract even more high
frequency traders.
Investors have yet to return in full force since the “flash crash”, leaving the market vulnerable to the machinations of the algo-bots, indexers and other short time-frame traders. In 1960 the average holding period for stocks was 8 years, in 1970-5yrs., 1980-33 mos., 1990-26 mos., 2000-14 mos., 2010-6mos, and in 2011 just a little over 2 mos ( NYSE Factbook). In addition, markets have become fragmented. Mary Shapiro admitted, as little as five years ago, the NYSE executed nearly 80 percent of volume in listed stocks. Today, the NYSE executes approximately 26 percent of the volume in its listed stocks. The remaining volume is split among more than 10 public exchanges, more than 30 dark pools, and more than 200 internalizing broker-dealers. 30 percent of volume in U.S.-listed equities is executed in venues that do not display their liquidity or make it generally available to the public.
The trader initiating a transaction is said to demand liquidity and the opposite side of the trade supplies liquidity. Liquidity demanders place market orders and pay the spread, and liquidity suppliers place limit orders and earn the spread. The algorithms that drive high frequency trading respond quickly to order flow and price . Quotes are revised in response to trading, and trading is done in response to changes in quotes, giving rise to a two‐way dynamic relationship.
Algos can easily take into account common factor price information and adjust trading and quoting accordingly, moving away or cancelling existing bids and offers. Other algos are designed to identify order flow and other information patterns in the data and react in the same way or shut down altogether. Liquidity demanders will wait until the supply of liquidity is ample, therefore, volatility is more often a result of liquidity being pulled by suppliers e.g., the flash crash, than an increase in buying or selling that demands liquidity.
Markets tend to function well when a sufficient number of diverse investors interact (liquid markets), and they tend to become fragile when this diversity breaks down (illiquid markets). In an illiquid market weak hands will act in concert, and take the same position based on the observations of others; independent of their own. This of course, leaves them vulnerable to getting blindsided by predatory traders and parasitic algorithms. The attendant volatility and velocity of current moves, along with the absence of follow-through, is evidence of this phenomena. In spite of the Fed’s almost daily injections of liquidity, headline risk regarding sovereign debt spreads continues to embolden the strong hands to pull liquidity when they sense the timing to be advantageous. The bulls have stepped up to the plate and continue to bring the market back each time, like a game of Pong, but professional money is still short. They continue to blame the volatility on Euro-uncertainty, but it is simply the flag of convenience under which they sail, and the corollary of their self-interest and bias. It also the reason why they will continue to do it.
Market structure continues to evolve at a rapid pace while traditional market practices quickly disappear. Obligations to provide liquidity and restrictions prohibiting practices that would disrupt market stability are disappearing, which gives rise to some very relevant questions.
Is the market more (evolving)or less (devolving) efficient now?
Is high volatility caused by a lack of liquidity, or is the lack of liquidity caused by high volatility?
Does higher volume mean greater liquidity?
What happens when HFTs make up 80% or 90% of the volume?
What happens if the market continues to fragment?
Should liquidity providers be allowed to pull liquidity completely?
Is attendant volume still valid as a metric of price action?
What happens when the average holding time for stocks is a a day?
Should there be a transaction Tax for HFTs?
What does the increased velocity of price moves mean for price discovery and market stability?
Is price discovery nothing more than a negative feedback loop?
Are the major equity indices just a de facto measure of the money supply?
Is the Volker rule to be blamed?
Investors have yet to return in full force since the “flash crash”, leaving the market vulnerable to the machinations of the algo-bots, indexers and other short time-frame traders. In 1960 the average holding period for stocks was 8 years, in 1970-5yrs., 1980-33 mos., 1990-26 mos., 2000-14 mos., 2010-6mos, and in 2011 just a little over 2 mos ( NYSE Factbook). In addition, markets have become fragmented. Mary Shapiro admitted, as little as five years ago, the NYSE executed nearly 80 percent of volume in listed stocks. Today, the NYSE executes approximately 26 percent of the volume in its listed stocks. The remaining volume is split among more than 10 public exchanges, more than 30 dark pools, and more than 200 internalizing broker-dealers. 30 percent of volume in U.S.-listed equities is executed in venues that do not display their liquidity or make it generally available to the public.
The trader initiating a transaction is said to demand liquidity and the opposite side of the trade supplies liquidity. Liquidity demanders place market orders and pay the spread, and liquidity suppliers place limit orders and earn the spread. The algorithms that drive high frequency trading respond quickly to order flow and price . Quotes are revised in response to trading, and trading is done in response to changes in quotes, giving rise to a two‐way dynamic relationship.
Algos can easily take into account common factor price information and adjust trading and quoting accordingly, moving away or cancelling existing bids and offers. Other algos are designed to identify order flow and other information patterns in the data and react in the same way or shut down altogether. Liquidity demanders will wait until the supply of liquidity is ample, therefore, volatility is more often a result of liquidity being pulled by suppliers e.g., the flash crash, than an increase in buying or selling that demands liquidity.
Markets tend to function well when a sufficient number of diverse investors interact (liquid markets), and they tend to become fragile when this diversity breaks down (illiquid markets). In an illiquid market weak hands will act in concert, and take the same position based on the observations of others; independent of their own. This of course, leaves them vulnerable to getting blindsided by predatory traders and parasitic algorithms. The attendant volatility and velocity of current moves, along with the absence of follow-through, is evidence of this phenomena. In spite of the Fed’s almost daily injections of liquidity, headline risk regarding sovereign debt spreads continues to embolden the strong hands to pull liquidity when they sense the timing to be advantageous. The bulls have stepped up to the plate and continue to bring the market back each time, like a game of Pong, but professional money is still short. They continue to blame the volatility on Euro-uncertainty, but it is simply the flag of convenience under which they sail, and the corollary of their self-interest and bias. It also the reason why they will continue to do it.
Market structure continues to evolve at a rapid pace while traditional market practices quickly disappear. Obligations to provide liquidity and restrictions prohibiting practices that would disrupt market stability are disappearing, which gives rise to some very relevant questions.
Is the market more (evolving)or less (devolving) efficient now?
Is high volatility caused by a lack of liquidity, or is the lack of liquidity caused by high volatility?
Does higher volume mean greater liquidity?
What happens when HFTs make up 80% or 90% of the volume?
What happens if the market continues to fragment?
Should liquidity providers be allowed to pull liquidity completely?
Is attendant volume still valid as a metric of price action?
What happens when the average holding time for stocks is a a day?
Should there be a transaction Tax for HFTs?
What does the increased velocity of price moves mean for price discovery and market stability?
Is price discovery nothing more than a negative feedback loop?
Are the major equity indices just a de facto measure of the money supply?
Is the Volker rule to be blamed?
